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ARGUMENT 
I, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. 
Regarding those findings of fact clearly labeled as such by 
the trial court, the City does not at this point request those 
findings be overruled. Where any finding of fact is couched as a 
conclusion of law, or presents itself as a mixed question of law 
and fact, the City would request the trial court's conclusions of 
law be overturned as an improper application of State v. White, 
856 P. 2d 656 (Utah 1993) . For example, the City does challenge 
the trial court's characterization of the prior interactions 
between the officer and the defendant as a "fairly significant 
acquaintenship". See Conclusion of Law 4, City Brief (hereinafter 
"CB") at 20, and Defendant Brief (hereinafter UDB"), Addendum. 
To the extent this "finding of fact" is concerned, the City has 
marshaled the evidence. It is the City's position that 
irrespective of whether the trial court's characterization is 
accepted by this court or not, under State v. White, the court's 
conclusions of law are incorrect. 
The defendant asserts that: 
The City erroneously argues that the trial court 
failed to evaluate the significance of uncontroverted 
facts. In so arguing, the City states that the 
circumstantial information available to the officer in 
this case increased concern for officer safety and 
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justified the frisk. Just the opposite was true as 
properly found by the court. All of the court's 
findings of fact were amply supported by the court 
record. . . . 
DB at 6. 
The impact of circumstantial information on a reasonable 
officer's state of mind is ultimately a conclusion of law, and 
appears under that heading in the trial court's ruling: 
4. Based on the Officer's testimony, and on his fairly 
significant acquaintenship with Defendant, as well as 
the fact that Defendant was at a location fully 
justified by his employment, which fact was known to 
the officer, the Court determines that reasonable 
officer's fears would have been appropriately dispelled 
and that the need for a frisk dissipated before the 
frisk was undertaken. 
See Defendant's Brief, Addendum. 
Under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, even 
circumstantial information is properly considered. The defendant 
continues: "Accordingly, the court concluded that the officer's 
suspicions were dispelled. See Addendum. In so concluding that 
the officer's fears were dispelled and the need for a frisk 
dissipated, the court implicitly found that reasonable inquiries 
were warranted in this case." Defendant's Brief at 8. This 
argument is presented in the Defendant's Brief under the heading 
"POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE PROPERLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD." Defendant's Brief at 6. The trial 
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court did not determine as a matter of fact that the officer's 
concern for safety was in fact dispelled. The trial court did 
rule that as a matter of law, under the trial court's view of the 
law relying on State v. White, a reasonable officer's concerns 
would have been dispelled. This is not a finding of fact, but a 
conclusion of law. 
These assertions demonstrate that the defendant is blurring 
the line between Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Concluding that a reasonable officer's fears should have been 
dispelled under certain facts is a legal conclusion, at the most 
a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore entitled to less 
deference as a matter of law under the standards of review. 
The defendant further mischaracterizes the factual findings 
and conclusions of law: "Accordingly, the court properly found 
that the officer was not concerned for his safety because of the 
number of people present." Defendant's Brief at 11. The trial 
court never quite states its conclusions this way. What the 
trial court does say is this: 
7. Although Officer Wooldridge testified that he had 
some concern because he did not know the other 
individual in the alley, the officer frisked Mr. 
Medina, the person that was known to him, first; 
therefore the court finds that Officer Wooldridge did 
not objectively evidence any heightened concern about 
the unknown person. 
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See Defendant's Brief, Addendum (emphasis added). The trial 
court acknowledges that the officer expressed concern because the 
other individual was unknown to him, and then dismisses that 
additional unknown factor, stating that the officer did not 
objectively evidence any heightened concern about the unknown 
person. 
The officer expressed concern that he did not know the 
unknown person, an additional factor to be considered under the 
totality of the circumstances, but dismissed by the trial court. 
The one fact in such a finding is that the officer did not know 
the other person in the alley. Nothing more can be derived from 
that fact. Presumably, the trial court desired additional 
information that suggested the unknown person presented an actual 
and/or imminent threat instead of a potential threat. That 
additional information is not required under the facts of this 
case. 
The defendant also makes an issue of the fact that the 
officer frisked the defendant first and not the unknown person. 
It is only logical that the officer first frisked the person who 
had the screwdriver in hand. The defendant suggests that somehow 
this indicates the officer had no concern about the unknown 
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person. See DB at 10. The officer testified otherwise: "I'm 
alone, I have two people with me . . . I believe that any other 
action than to check these people for weapons would be detriment 
[sic] to my physical safety." The officer further testified that 
in his experience he had encountered persons who carried weapons 
and would attack a police officer. Transcript (April 7, 1997) at 
31-32. 
The defendant also asserts that because the unknown person 
was not in the officer's line of sight at all times, that this 
means the officer was not concerned about that person. The 
defendant asserts a fact not in the record when he states that 
the officer "surely would not allow one suspect to be behind him 
while he addressed the other." DB at 11. There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the unknown person was behind the officer. 
The officer testified that the other gentleman was not within 
his eyesight, and stated he believed the other gentleman was off 
to the officer's left. The officer also stated that the other 
gentleman was not moving, with his hands either on his head or in 
plain view. Transcript (April 17, 1997) at 27. 
If someone tells the officer a truth (here, that the car is 
his and he has locked his keys out of it) that the officer cannot 
immediately verify, the officer's safety concern does not 
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dissipate until that truth is verified. And even if the 
assertion is ultimately confirmed, until that verification takes 
place, the officer's safety may be at risk. Even if an officer 
waits for backup, the officer's safety may be at risk until that 
backup arrives. It is possible the person has a firearm and may 
decide to use it while waiting for backup to arrive. 
The City approaches the trial court's clearly labeled 
findings of fact in this manner. They are supported by the 
record in one sense. But they ignore the details and the context 
of the situation the officer faced on that occasion. The trial 
court failed to evaluate the significance of uncontroverted 
facts. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY THE LAW, 
The trial court relied primarily on State v. White. 
However, the trial court provided little analysis of how State v. 
White applied to its findings of fact. The defendant's brief 
follows that pattern, providing little analysis of State v. White 
and how it applies to the trial court's findings of fact. The 
trial court does not demonstrate how its facts support its 
conclusions of law under the analysis of State v. White. What 
the trial court characterizes as a "fairly significant 
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acquaintenship" in its conclusions of law amounts to this finding 
of fact: "6. Officer Wooldridge had had numerous conversations 
with defendant, knew he was an employee of the adjacent 
establishment, and although he knew of a criminal record, Officer 
Wooldridge did not specifically identify any history of violence 
during his testimony." 
If an officer knows that someone has a criminal record, 
without knowing the exact nature of that record, why is any 
criminal record insignificant? Does a peace officer have to know 
that someone's criminal record is a violent one before the 
knowledge that any criminal record exists becomes relevant? Does 
a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances require a full 
search of the suspect's criminal record? Where the primary theme 
of a known criminal record is burglary (arguably a non-violent 
offense), does that become relevant? Where the primary theme of 
the criminal record is violent, is the officer allowed to search? 
If someone had a record consisting of one Disturbing the Peace 
infraction (possibly a violence-related offense), is the officer 
allowed to search? If a suspect had a record consisting of 
felony burglary and spent time in prison, is the officer allowed 
to search? 
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In the field, do these concerns merit additional further 
inquiry? Is it appropriate to require that additional further 
inquiry of an officer in this position? Under the facts, even as 
the trial court found them, how does knowledge of a criminal 
record figure into the equation? Neither the trial court's 
original conclusions of law, nor the defendant's brief addresses 
the City's concerns raised in its initial brief. Any criminal 
record at all may be significant given the situation. And that 
is the situation here. Under a "totality of the circumstances" 
approach, a criminal record is one more circumstance that 
contributes to a totality where the search was legally 
permissible. 
Other than the above, the City would direct the Court of 
Appeals to its analysis of State v. White in its initial brief, 
which fully addresses the application of State v. White to this 
case. 
III. THE MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL HERE. 
The City's position was fully identified in its initial 
brief at page 16: "Here, the trial court 'failed . to evaluate 
the significance of uncontroverted facts, or facts as the court 
found them'; therefore the trial court's conclusion was ''induced 
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by an erroneous view of the law''. White, 856 P. 2d at 659 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 p.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) 
(citations omitted))." 
The City's position in its initial brief is not that the 
trial court's ruling should be overturned on the basis that the 
trial court's findings of fact had no support in the record. It 
is the City's position that the trial court's conclusions of law 
based on those facts are an inaccurate/mistaken application of 
the law as set forth in State v. White. 
Under the City's "Statement of Relevant Facts", each of the 
trial court's findings of fact is taken in turn, and all relevant 
testimonial evidence from the hearing is set forth after each of 
the trial court's factual findings. The defendant points to no 
omission of fact, nor to any mischaracterization of the facts 
from which the trial court derived its findings of fact. The 
substantive hearing testimony on which the trial court relied is 
fully set forth in the City's initial brief. See City's Brief at 
pp. 6-14. To the extent any factual findings are mixed with 
conclusions of law under the trial court's heading "Conclusions 
of Law", the City sufficiently demonstrates in its initial brief 
how those are not supported by the record. The City would submit 
that in substance the marshaling requirements have been met, if 
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in fact such marshaling is required here. 
The defendant asserts that: "the City failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to 
the court, the evidence was insufficient to support the findings. 
Affirmance of the trial court's order suppressing evidence is 
therefore required." See Defendant's Brief at 5-6. Defendant 
points to no authority for such a mandatory affirmance of the 
decision below and dismissal of an appeal. 
The marshaling requirement is a precursor to an appellate 
court's striking a lower court's findings of fact. Where the 
only assertion is that the factual findings below were 
unsupported by the record, perhaps dismissal for failure to 
marshal the evidence would be appropriate. Where the application 
of the law to the facts is the focused issue, it is appropriate 
to consider that application, even if the marshaling requirement 
is not met. The defendant's focus on the marshaling requirement 
is misdirected, and irrelevant here. Even if the City were fully 
challenging the factual findings, and even if the City had failed 
to Marshall the evidence, dismissal of this appeal is not 
required. In such situations the Court of Appeals accepts the 
findings of fact and moves on to the conclusions of law. "If the 
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appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court 
and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." 
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
Conclusion 
The trial court failed to evaluate the significance of 
uncontroverted facts, or facts as the court found them. The 
trial court's conclusions of law based on the facts are 
incorrect. The trial court's conclusions were induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. State v. White. 856 P. 2d 656 (Utah 
1993) , and related case law, does not authorize the trial court 
to grant a motion to suppress under the facts presented by this 
case. The defendant's brief does not alter these conclusions. 
Dismissal for failure to Marshall evidence is not appropriate 
here. The Court of Appeals should fully consider the application 
of the law to these facts. 
The City respectfully renews its request that the trial 
court's order suppressing the frisk evidence be overruled and 
that the matter be remanded to the District Court for trial. 
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